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Abstract
We propose a novel approach to modelling time preferences, based on a cognitive
shortcoming of human decision makers: the perception of future events becomes
increasingly ‘blurred’ as the events are pushed further in time. Our model explains
behavioural ‘anomalies’ such as preference reversal and cyclical choice.
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11 Introduction
Most economic decisions involve an appraisal of future outcomes. The standard model
used to deal with this issue is the exponential discounting model (EDM), according to
which1 an outcome x available at time t is evaluated as δ
tu(x), with δ ac o n s t a n td i s c o u n t
factor and u the instantaneous utility of x. However, in the last decade evidence has
accumulated contradicting the predictions of the EDM. In particular, it is clear that
individuals often exhibit the so-called preference reversal phenomenon, whereby an initial
preference between an earlier outcome and a later one is reversed once both outcomes are
delayed by the same amount of time.
In the last decade an alternative model, which is consistent with this type of evidence,
has enjoyed considerable prominence and success in the literature. This is the model
of hyperbolic discounting (HDM)2, in which the discount factor is a hyperbolic function
of time. The central point of this approach is that the rate of time preference between
alternatives is not constant but varies, and in particular decreases as delay increases.
The simplest and most popular form of hyperbolic discounting occurs in a two-parameter
model which may be termed the β − δ model. In this model, the rate of time preference
between a present alternative and a future one is βδ, whereas the rate of time preference
between two future alternatives is δ. So we may have for example u(x) > βδu(y)a n d
δ
t+1u(y) > δ
tu(x), ‘rationalising’ a preference reversal. The HDM approach is extremely
fruitful in addressing some of the issues raised by the experimental evidence, so much so
that it has almost become a new consensus.
Yet we believe that some closer scrutiny, and an appraisal of the cognitive sources of
the ‘anomalies’ is needed. For example Rubinstein ([26] and [27]) shows experimentally
that precisely the same type of decision situations that may create a diﬃculty for the EDM
may also be problematic for the HDM. Furthermore, Read [22] shows that the existing
experimental evidence is consistent with other explanations, most notably subadditivity
of discounting.3
There is also evidence that human decision-makers depart in an even more fundamental
way from standard models: they may make intransitive choices. Although most data in
this direction come from choices under risk, what evidence is available for time preferences
suggests that violations of transitivity are even more frequent in this domain. Tversky et
al. [35] show that a substantial 15% of subjects exhibited cyclical patterns of choice that
1See Fishburn and Rubinstein [7].
2See for instance Phelps and Pollack [19], Loewenstein and Prelec [14], Laibson [13], Frederick et al.
[8], O’Donoghue and Rabin [16], [17].
3See Frederick et al. [8] for a review of these issues.
2could not be explained by ‘framing eﬀects’. Roelofsma and Read’s [23] experiment is even
more striking: they found that the majority of intertemporal choices were intransitive.
This type of evidence, which we consider crucial in guiding our intuition about time
preferences, has been somewhat downplayed in the mainstream economic literature on
time preferences. This contrasts with the theory of choice under risk, where at least two
main approaches (prospect theory and regret theory) explain cyclical choices. A notable
exception is the very general paper by Ok and Masatlioglu [18], who have axiomatised a
class of models of choice over time. These include as particular cases HDM, Rubinstein’s
([26], [27]) similarity theory and Read’s subadditive discounting among several others, and
some of the representations admitted by their axioms are compatible with intransitivities.
We view the body of evidence against the EDM as indicating that human agents use
heuristic procedures to make choices over time that diﬀer fundamentally from the simple
m a x i m i s a t i o no fac o m p l e t ep r e f e r e n c eo r d e r i n ga sa s s u m e db o t hi nE D Ma n di nH D M .
We suggest that at the root of ‘anomalies’ like preference reversals and intransitivities
is a basic cognitive shortcoming, noted by several thinkers on the topic and in popular
wisdom: the perception of events that will occur in the future is ‘blurred’, and possibly it
becomes increasingly blurred as the events are pushed farther in time45. As a consequence,
deciding between alternatives to be obtained in the distant future is intrinsically harder
than deciding between the same alternatives available earlier. For instance, an individual
may ﬁnd 1000 euros now distinctly preferable to 1100 euros in one year time, but may
well hesitate when asked to decide between 1000 euros in ten years or 1100 euros in eleven
years. In our view, the evaluation of a time-dependent alternative has, on the one hand, a
pure time preference aspect: most people prefer alternatives to be available sooner rather
than later (this may be a ‘hard-wired’ feature of animal brains, see e.g. Ainslie [3]).
On the other hand, the farther two alternatives are in time, the more diﬃcult it is to
distinguish between them on the basis of an explicit time-outcome trade-oﬀ:w er e f e rt o
this cognitive condition as vagueness. In our theory we propose that behaviour can be
rationalised by a combination of three factors:
4For example, according to Pigou [20] “our telescopic faculty is defective, and we, therefore, see future
pleasures, as it were, on a diminished scale”. Also, B¨ ohm-Bawerk [4] stated that “..we limn a more or
less incomplete picture of our future wants and especially of the remotely distant ones.”
5These notions are well established in proverbs, from “we’ll cross that bridge when we come to it”
to “hindsight is better than foresight”, “it will all be the same in a hundred years” for the anglosaxon
tradition, to “En cien a˜ nos todos calvos” and “Tra tre anni beato chi ha un occhio” from the Spanish
and Italian tradition, respectively (which translate as “In a hundred years we’ll all be bald” and “Blessed
he who still has got an eye left in three years”. Interestingly, for the latter proverb the user is free to
change the lenght of time as she sees ﬁt). See for instance Taylor [32], Simpson and Speake [29], Rovira
[24], Pittano [21].
3• impatience;
• ‘vagueness’ in the perception of future alternatives; and
• a suitable heuristics to make a choice when vagueness is ‘high’.
The decision maker will initially attempt to express a preference between two alter-
natives based on an explicit trade-oﬀ between outcome and time (that is, between his
impatience and his desire to obtain more). When unable to do so, he will rely on a
‘vagueness-breaking criterion’. This criterion is based on a lexicographic consideration
of the two dimensions (time and outcome) involved in the comparison. That is to say,
the decision maker chooses the alternative that is better according to the dimension that
he regards as the most important. This is in accord with evidence and theory in the
psychology literature. As for example Tversky et al. [36] note,
‘Because it is often unclear how to trade one attribute against another, a
common procedure for resolving conﬂict in such situations is to select the
option that is superior on the more important attribute. This procedure,
which is essentially lexicographic, has two attractive features. First, it does
not require the decision maker to assess the trade-oﬀ between the attributes,
thereby reducing mental eﬀort and cognitive strain. Second, it provides a
compelling argument for choice that can be used to justify the decision to
oneself as well as to others.’ (p. 505, our italics)
The economic literature on individual preferences traditionally looks for representation
results that ‘compress’ preferences within a single ‘indicator’, a utility function which
summarises the agent’s evaluation of all aspects of an alternative. On the contrary,
the psychological theories of choice tend to be completely heuristic based. We see our
theory as ‘spanning’ the gap between the two approaches since, although agents’ evaluate
alternatives ‘in their entirety’, they are not always able to tell two alternatives apart: it
is only in the presence of vagueness that they rely on heuristic procedures.
Among heuristics based theories, the closest to our approach is Tversky’s [34] ‘lexico-
graphic semiorder’, according to which agents rely on their ranking of the attributes of
a (time dependent) alternative in a lexicographic way when choosing between diﬀerent
alternatives. The ﬁrst attribute of each alternative is compared, and if the diﬀerence
exceeds some threshold value then a choice is made accordingly. If the threshold value is
not exceeded, then the agent compares the second attribute of each alternative, and so
on.
4Both this approach and our theory are close in spirit to Rubinstein’s [27] suggestion
to extend his own similarity-based approach from risk to time preferences. He argues
that, when evaluating alternatives, agents may perceive these alternatives to be ‘similar’
in either the time or the outcome dimension. At the formal level, this notion of simi-
larity is closely related to our notion of vagueness. The crucial diﬀerence is that in our
model vagueness applies to alternatives (i.e. outcome-dates pairs), not only to each date
or outcome dimension separately. There are two aspects to this. First, vagueness (or
similarity) in one dimension may not be deﬁned independently of the other dimension.
For example, 1 Million today may be clearly distinct from 1.01 Million today; but from
today’s perspective the two amounts in thirty years time may well be considered similar6.
Second, ‘two-dimensional’ similarities between alternatives (outcome-date pairs) may be
independent of similarities along each dimension: you may be able to distinguish between
1 Million and 1.01 Million, and also between the dates ‘1 year from now’ now and ‘2 years
from now’, yet be unable to express a preference between 1.01 Million 2 years from now
and 1 Million 1 year from now. These diﬀerences are important. Indeed, Rubinstein [25]
shows that his similarity approach generates an essentially unique transitive preference
relation on alternatives7, and takes it as evidence that utility theory is hardly reconcilable
with experimental data. On the contrary, as observed above, our theory, though utility
based, can easily explain a range of both transitive and cyclical choices.
Our contribution is two-fold. First, we provide a class of parsimonious representations
of an individual’s basic time-outcome trade-oﬀ, in which a standard utility function (of
time and outcomes) is combined, in an additive way, with a ‘vagueness function’. At the
formal level, these representations take the form of interval orders or semiorders. Second,
we focus on a very simple such representation - which we dub the σ − δ model - and
combine it with the ‘vagueness-breaking’ criterion described above in order to examine
choice behaviour. Needless to say, heuristics by deﬁnition cannot be axiomatised; we
show how a simple ‘rule of thumb’ which has been widely studied in the psychological
literature can be used to complete the basic transitive partial order when the latter leaves
the decision maker ‘vague’.
In this way we can explain for instance the phenomenon of preference reversal with
an interpretation that seems to us more adherent to the psychological basis for it. More
strikingly, the model can also account for cyclical patterns of choice, which are obvi-
ously incompatible with theories such as HDM and EDM, based as they are upon the
6This aspect has been underlined and studied, in a risk context, by Aizpur´ ua et al. ([2] and [1]) and
Uriarte [37], who develop the concept of ‘correlated similarities’.
7Vil` a [38] shows that with three dimensions Rubinstein’s similarity approach generates intransitivities.
See also Gilboa and Lapson [10].
5maximisation of a preference ordering.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We start by postulating a partial order
(the ‘primary criterion’) on the set of outcome-date pairs, together with a ‘secondary
criterion’ which embodies the vagueness-breaking heuristics (section 2). Next, we narrow
down further this partial order, and impose axioms which specialise it to an interval order
or a semiorder, which can be represented in a standard, additively separable, way (section
3). In section 4 we present our σ − δ model and consider preference reversal, cycles and
the now or never fallacy application. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Let X indicate a set of outcomes (e.g. money amounts) on which there exists a reﬂexive,
complete and transitive preference relation R. We denote the symmetric and asymmetric
components of R by I and P, respectively. Let T be the set of dates. The setof alternatives
is a set of outcome-date pairs A ⊆ X × T.
We imagine that the preference relation º∗ of the individual on A is constructed as
follows. There exists a primary criterion on the basis of which the individual makes
comparisons between alternatives. We interpret the primary criterion as resolving com-
parisons for which the trade-oﬀ between outcome and delay yields, in the perception of the
individual, a decisive advantage to one of the alternatives: that is, for example, the loss
in the time dimension of one alternative clearly outweighs its advantage in the outcome
dimension. Because of the cognitive limitations discussed in the introduction, however,
there may be pairs of alternatives that cannot be ranked by the primary criterion alone:
the outcome-delay trade-oﬀ may not oﬀer a basis for decision, and the individual has
cognitive ‘holes’. In this case, and only in this case, a secondary criterion is used. The
relation º∗ is derived by a combination of primary and secondary criteria.
More formally, let the primary criterion be a strict partial order Â on A (that is, an
irreﬂexive and transitive binary relation on A). When a pair of alternatives a,b ∈ A is
not ordered by Â we denote this fact by a ∼ b,i . e .
(not a Â b,not b Â a) ⇔ a ∼ b
and say that a and b are vague. Under our assumptions the relation ∼ may not be
transitive. As mentioned above, ∼ does not mean indiﬀerence between two alternatives,
but simply the inability to express a strict preference. We call this situation vagueness.
The secondary criterion is used to rank alternatives which are vague. As explained
in the introduction, there is psychological evidence that when individuals are unable to
compare alternatives on the basis of a trade-oﬀ between the various dimensions of those
6alternatives, they rely on lexicographic-type comparisons, by focussing on the ‘dominant’
dimension8. In our model there are two dimensions, time and outcome. Thus, a natural
secondary criterion is to allow the individual to rank two alternatives which are vague
under Â ﬁrst according to the preference ordering R over the (pure) outcomes, and if this
still does not result in a strict preference, according to time precedence. Formally, let º∗
denote a complete preference relation (not necessarily transitive) on A.S o w e c o n s i d e r
the following model:
Outcome Prominence Model (OPM): Let i =( xi,t i) ∈ A. Then:
1. a Â∗ b ⇔
(a) a Â b (Primary Criterion), or
(b) (a ∼ b,xaPxb)o r( a ∼ b,xaIxb,t a <t b) (Secondary Criterion)
2. a ∼∗ b ⇔ (a ∼ b,xaIxb,t a = tb)
The other natural model in place of OPM is:
Time Prominence Model (TPM): Let i =( xi,t i) ∈ A. Then:
1. a Â∗ b ⇔
(a) a Â b or
(b) (a ∼ b,ta <t b)o r( a ∼ b,ta = tb,x aPxb)
2. a ∼∗ b ⇔ (a ∼ b,xaIxb,t a = tb)
3 General representation results
In this section we provide a number of representation results for the primary ordering Â.
These are based on various assumptions on both the structure of the set of alternatives
and the cognitive abilities of the decision maker. All the results represent preferences by
means of two real valued functions u and σ on the set of alternatives.
The natural interpretation is that the u function expresses the ‘pure’ time preferences
of the individual. This function can be chosen to be monotonic in the natural direction in
both outcome and time. On the other hand σ is the ‘vagueness function’ which captures
the imaginative diﬃculty the individual faces when appraising outcomes in the future.
There are two notable aspects of the representations. First, the vagueness term enters
8S e ee . g .S l o v i c[ 3 0 ] ,T v e r s k yet al. [36] and Shaﬁr et al. [28].
7additively. Second, the vagueness when appraising whether a =( x,tx)i sb e t t e rt h a n
b =( y,ty) is a function of the components of b alone; it does not depend on tx or x.
In what follows we say that a preference ordering Â is (u,σ)-representable if there
exist real valued functions u and σ on A such that
(x,tx) Â (y,ty) ⇔ u(x,tx) >u(y,ty)+σ (y,ty)∀(x,tx),(y,ty) ∈ A
It is worth comparing our class of representations with that of Ok and Masatlioglu
[18]. They consider a complete binary preference relation B over a set of outcome-
date pairs and axiomatise the following representation class: (x,t)B (y,s)i fa n do n l y
if U (x) ≥ U (y)+ϕ(s,t), where U is interpreted as an instantaneous utility function and
ϕ captures the eﬀect of time delay. In this representation, which is not an interval order,
the ‘contributions’ of outcome and time to the agent’s utility are separated, unlike in our
model. Note that in Ok and Masatlioglu’s approach cycles can be accounted for without
resorting to a secondary criterion. Our view is diﬀerent: the primary criterion represents
the ‘fully rational’ component of decision making, hence we assume it transitive. In our
approach intransitivities are the byproduct of resorting to the rule of thumb invoked when
‘full rationality’ is not decisive.
3.1 Finite sets of alternatives
With vague time preferences, an individual is not always able to compare two alternatives
a and b. However we require that the individual has at least some discriminatory ability
regarding the sets of alternative dominated by a and b, respectively. Formally, let L(a)
denote the lower contour set of a ∈ A,t h a ti sL(a)={b|a Â b},a n dl e tV (a)d e n o t et h e
vague set of a,t h a ti sV (a)={b|a ∼ b}. Then we assume:
Discrimination: For every alternatives a,b ∈ A either L(a) ⊆ L(b)o rL(b) ⊆ L(a).
Transitivity of Â ensures that L(b) ⊂ L(a)w h e n e v e ra Â b, thus Discrimination has a
bite only in the case of vague alternatives. Two alternatives a and b m a yb es ov a g u et h a t
they also have the same set of worse alternatives. But suppose that the agent perceives
that alternatives that are not worse than a are worse than b. In this case, the agent
perceives some kind of improvement in moving from a to b (though not strong enough to
make b preferred to a). The property of Discrimination requires that after the ‘improving’
move to b no alternative that was dominated by a ceases to be dominated (and it poses
the converse requirement if the move to b was perceived to be negative). In other words,
8moving from one alternative to the other may involve either an (weak) improvement or a
(weak) worsening in the above sense, but not both.9
Next, we consider some straightforward monotonicity properties:
Time Monotonicity (i): For every x ∈ X and t1,t 2 ∈ T with t2 >t 1: L(x,t2) ⊆
L(x,t1).
Time Monotonicity (ii): For every x,y ∈ X and t,t1,t 2 ∈ T with t2 >t 1:( x,t2) ∈
V (y,t)i m p l i e s( x,t1) / ∈ L(y,t).
The requirements of Time Monotonicity are that: ﬁrst, anything which is dominated
by some alternative a must also be dominated by an alternative with the same outcome
as a but at an earlier time; and, second, that given a relationship of vagueness between
two contemporaneous alternatives, it cannot be that anticipating one of them makes it
dominated by the other one. Note that these allow for two alternatives with the same
outcome available at diﬀerent times to be vague. Similar requirements can be imposed in
the outcome dimension:
Outcome Monotonicity (i): For every x1,x 2 ∈ X and t ∈ T with x2Px 1: L(x1,t) ⊆
L(x2,t).
Outcome Monotonicity (ii): For every y,x1,x 2 ∈ X and t,t0 ∈ T with x2Px1:( x1,t) ∈
V (y,t0) implies (x2,t) / ∈ L(y,t0).
Our next representation result applies to the case where the number of alternatives is
arbitrarily large but ﬁnite.
Proposition 1 Let Discrimination, Time Monotonicity (i) and Outcome Monotonicity
(i) hold. Let L(a) be ﬁnite for all a ∈ A.T h e nÂ is (u,σ)-representable with σ (a) > 0
for all a ∈ A and u non-decreasing in outcome and non-increasing in time.
Proof. For any a ∈ A,d e ﬁne u(a)=# L(a). By Time Monotonicity (i) and Outcome
Monotonicity (i),t h ef u n c t i o nu is weakly monotonic in the desired direction with respect





9An alternative justiﬁcation for Discrimination is the ‘sure-thing’ property if alternatives were allowed
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and similarly for ∼. It is easily seen that Discrimination on the riskless alternative would follow.
9Then let







Observe that for any two alternatives c,d with c Â d it must be u(c) >u (d)( s i n c e
L(d) ⊆ L(c) by the transitivity of Â, and since d ∈ L(c) but c/ ∈ L(c), implying
#L(c) > #L(d)).
We show that u and σ as deﬁned above represent Â.
Let a Â b.T h e n u(a) >u(b) by the above observation. Now suppose in negation
that
u(a) ≤ u(b)+σ (b)







2 we get an immediate contradic-
tion (since u(a) − u(b) >
1
2). So let σ (b)=u(b∗) − u(b) and therefore
u(a) ≤ u(b)+σ(b)=u(b
∗)
By the above inequality and the deﬁnition of u,# L(b∗) ≥ #L(a). Then by Discrimi-
nation L(b∗) ⊇ L(a). By the fact that b ∈ L(a)t h i si m p l i e sb ∈ L(b∗), contradicting
b ∈ V (b∗).
Consider now a ∼ b. We need to show that both u(a) ≤ u(b)+σ (b)a n du(b) ≤
u(a)+σ (a). If b = a∗ then u(b)=u(a∗) ≤ u(a)+σ (a), and if b 6= a∗ then, by the
deﬁnition of a∗, u(b) ≤ u(a∗) ≤ u(a)+σ (a). Therefore in all cases u(b) ≤ u(a)+σ(a).
The same argument applies interchanging a and b,s ot h a tu and σ as deﬁned above
represent ∼.
Finally assume u(a) >u (b)+σ (b). Then by Discrimination L(a) ⊃ L(b). So it
cannot be b Â a, since then we would have a ∈ L(b)b u ta/ ∈ L(a), a contradiction. It
cannot be b ∈ V (a) either, since then u(a) ≤ u(b)+σ (b).
T h ec a s eo faﬁnite set of alternatives A is a natural setting for this result. Observe
however that all that is required is that L(a)i sﬁnite10.
The assumptions of Discrimination and Time and Outcome Monotonicity are too weak
to allow for a constant σ,e v e nw i t hs i m p l eﬁnite sets of alternatives. We illustrate this
with an example (see ﬁgure 1, in which the arrows denote dominance and the dashed lines
denote vagueness).
Example 2 X = {x,y} with xPy and T = {0,1,2}, A = X × T and (x,0) Â (x,1) Â
(x,2), (x,0) Â (y,2) with all other relations not implied by the transitivity of Â beingones








Figure 1: An illustration of example 3.
of vagueness. So, L(x,0) = {(x,1),(x,2),(y,2)},L (x,1) = {(x,2)} and for all other
a ∈ A, L(a)=∅. Then it is easily checked that these preferences satisfy Discrimination,
Time Monotonicity and Outcome Monotonicity, so that there exists a u−σ representation.
However, the relations (x,0) Â (x,1), (x,1) Â (x,2), (y,1) ∼ (x,2) and (x,0) ∼ (y,1)
with σ constant would be equivalent to:
u(x,0) >u(x,1) + σ
u(x,1) >u(x,2) + σ
u(y,1) ≤ u(x,2) + σ and u(x,2) ≤ u(y,1) + σ
u(x,0) ≤ u(y,1) + σ and u(y,1) ≤ u(x,0) + σ
From the last two lines it follows that
u(x,0) − σ ≤ u(x,2) + σ
whereas from the ﬁrst two inequalities we have
u(x,0) − σ >u(x,2) + σ
a contradiction.
3.2 Inﬁnite sets of alternatives
Consider now the case where the set of alternatives is allowed to be inﬁnite, and in
particular let X = T =[ 0 ,1]. A technique similar to the one used for proposition 1 can
11be applied, provided only that the sets L(a)a r es u ﬃciently regular as to be Lebesgue-
measurable (this will be the case in virtually every conceivable application), and that the
following hold:
Continuity: If a =( x,s) Â b =( y,t) then there exists ε > 0 such that (i) (x0,s 0) Â b
for all x0,s 0 ∈ [0,1] with |x0 − x| < ε and |s0 − s| < ε,a n d(ii) a Â (y0,t 0) for all
y0,t 0 ∈ [0,1] with |y0 − y| < ε and |t0 − t| < ε.
Betweenness: If a Â b then there exists (x,s) ∈ L(a)\L(b)a n dε such that (x0,s 0) ∈
L(a)\L(b)f o ra l lx0,s 0 ∈ [0,1] with |x0 − x| < ε and |s0 − s| < ε.
Continuity says that a strict preference between two alternatives should hold for all
other alternatives suﬃciently close the original two. Betweenness says that there exists
a (non-negligible) set of alternatives which lies ‘between’ (in terms of preference) any
two strictly ranked alternatives. ‘Between’ in this context means: worse that the better
alternative and not worse than the worse alternative. Such assumptions would be satisﬁed,
for example, in a model with ‘thick’ vagueness curves through an alternative, that separate
the upper and lower contour sets. However, there may be other patterns of cognitive
‘holes’, for example one where vagueness occurs very close to an alternative (because
the individual does not distinguish such close alternatives), it occurs again at far away
alternatives (for example because of the delay), and does not occur in the intermediate
region.
Proposition 3 Let X = T =[ 0 ,1]. Let Discrimination, Time Monotonicity (i), Out-
come Monotonicity (i), Continuity and Betweenness hold. Then Â is (u,σ)-representable
with σ (a) ≥ 0 for all a ∈ A and u non-decreasing in outcome and non-increasing in time.
Proof. The proof follows the same steps as the proof of proposition 1, taking care of
some additional technical details. It is given for completeness in the Appendix.
We can obtain a similar representation in the case of a countable set of alternatives,
using an alternative notion of continuity:
Proposition 4 Let X and T be countable sets. Let Discrimination, Time Monotonicity
(i), Outcome Monotonicity (i) hold. Suppose that (lim{an}) ∈ V (a) for any sequence
{an} with an ∈ V (a).T h e nÂ is (u,σ)-representable with σ (a) ≥ 0 for all a ∈ A and u
non-decreasing in outcome and non-increasing in time.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Finally, we provide a result which does not make any structural assumption on the set
of alternatives but is formulated directly in terms of a representation.
12Proposition 5 Let Â be (u,σ)-representable with σ (a) ≥ 0 for all a ∈ A and let Time
Monotonicity (i) and (ii), and Outcome Monotonicity (i) and (ii) hold. If σ can be chosen
to be non-increasing in outcome, then u can be chosen to be non-decreasing in outcome
at an arbitrarily large number of alternatives, and if σ can be chosen to be non-decreasing
in time then u can be chosen to be non-increasing in time at an arbitrarily large number
of alternatives.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Proposition 5 shows that the utility function can be chosen to display the expected
monotonicity properties (on an arbitrarily large number of alternatives) with respect to
the delaying and improvement of outcomes, provided that vagueness does not increase as
the outcome improves and it does not decrease as delay increases. This latter condition
in particular accords well with our motivating intuition, that the distance in time has
a blurring eﬀect on the comparisons between alternatives. Of course, this result is not
completely satisfactory because we would like to have an assumption on the primitives,
namely the preferences, implying the desired conditions on the function σ.
In the next section we concentrate on one element of the class of representations
obtained, which incorporates the feature of (relative) vagueness increasing with delay.
4T h e σ − δ model
From now on we consider X as a real interval, e.g. money amounts. For this setting we
propose our σ − δ model, a specialisation of the OPM and TPM. In doing so we follow
the hyperbolic discounting tradition whereby out of the entire hyperbolic family attention
has been focused on the application friendly β − δ version. There are several motives for
studying our chosen specialisation. First, it constitutes in a sense the minimal possible
departure from the standard EDM; yet its implications are still widely diﬀerent from that
of the EDM. Second, it is parsimonious, in that it depends only on two parameters, which
can be potentially estimated (see section 4.3). Third, the parameters have a natural
interpretation, and in particular they incorporate the psychological feature at the root of
our approach, that as choices are pushed further into the future the ‘vagueness’ associated
with the outcomes increases.
It is obvious, but still worth emphasising, that many other members of the class of
representations obtained in the previous sections would explain any of the anomalies to
be considered below. For an analogy, consider the popular β − δ version of hyperbolic
discounting: it has been chosen in most applications not because the particular discounting
13function associated with it has an axiomatic foundation, but rather because it is simple
and it departs from exponential discounting in a minimal way, while being able to explain
some EDM anomalies.11
The σ − δ model is a representation of the individual’s (primary) preferences that
depends on a discount parameter δ ∈ (0,1) and a vagueness parameter σ > 0. The
individual values alternatives using exponential discounting with factor δ and linear utility.
However, in order to regard an alternative better its discounted utility must exceed that
of a competing alternative by at least σ (Primary Criterion). That is, loosely speaking,
δ measures the way the individual trades oﬀ outcomes across time, while σ measures
the precision with which such trade-oﬀs can be made (see section 4.3 below for a more
precise interpretation). When the individual cannot compare alternatives on the basis of
present discounted value, his preferences conform to the Secondary Criterion, that is: in
the OPM he prefers the alternative corresponding to the higher amount of money, and if
the monetary amounts are the same for both alternatives, then he prefers the alternative
corresponding to the earlier date; while in the TPM he prefers the alternative delivering
the money at the earlier date, and if the delivery dates are the same for both alternatives,
then he prefers the alternative yielding the higher amount of money. Formally: in the



















x = y and tx <t y




11For another analogy, the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms say nothing about the convexity or
otherwise of the utility function. However an ‘inﬂected’ von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
has been postulated in the classic paper by Friedman and Savage [9] to explain the puzzle of people’s
















tx = ty and x>y
4.1 Cycles
Several contributions in decision theory have pointed out on both normative and descrip-
tive grounds that human decision procedures may generate non transitivity in choice (see
e.g. Tversky [34]; Rubinstein [25]; Tversky et al. [35]; Vil` a[ 3 8 ] ;R o e l o f s m aa n dR e a d ’ s
[23]; Read [22]; Ok and Masatlioglu [18]). To understand this phenomenon, consider the
following non time-related dietary example. You like your coﬀee sweet to the point of
neglecting dietary considerations, so that one sugar spoon is preferred to half a sugar-
spoon. However, the sweetening impact of a quarter spoon is negligible to your tongue:
in this case dietary considerations prevail and you prefer half a spoon to three quarters
and three quarters to one!12
With time preferences, we have argued for an analogous ‘switch of criterion’ when
vagueness occurs. So the preference relation º∗ generated by the OPM and TPM is not
necessarily transitive, even if both the primary and secondary criteria are, and this is true
for the σ − δ specialisation too.
Let us study the suﬃcient conditions for a cycle to occur with three alternatives (x,tx),
(y,ty)a n d( z,tz), with x>y>z .











tz + σ and zδ
tz ≤ yδ
ty + σ
so that (z,tz) Â∗ (x,tx) but (x,tx) ∼ (y,ty)a n d( y,ty) ∼ (z,tz) by the Primary Criterion.
By the Secondary Criterion (x,tx) Â∗ (y,ty)a n d( y,ty) Â∗ (z,tz). To see that these
12Similarly, our friend Faye likes a sweet at the end of a meal but nonetheless opts for a synthetic
sweetener with her coﬀee.
15inequalities are compatible, let for instance (x,tx)=( 1 0 ,3), (y,ty)=( 9 ,2) and (z,tz)=
(8,1). Then














These inequalities can be represented in the (σ,δ) space, with δ is measured on the
horizontal axis, as the gray and kinked black line in ﬁgure 2: any combination of δ and σ
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Figure 2: Admissible values of σ and δ i nt h eO P Mc y c l ee x a m p l e .











tz + σ and zδ
tz ≤ yδ
ty + σ
so that (z,tz) Â∗ (x,tx) but (x,tx) ∼ (y,ty)a n d( y,ty) ∼ (z,tz) by the Primary Criterion.
By the Secondary Criterion (x,tx) Â∗ (y,ty)a n d( y,ty) Â∗ (z,tz).
Using the same alternatives as in the example above, the inequalities are shown in
ﬁgure 3 below, where the locus σ = xδ
tx − zδ
tz is represented by the gray line and











is represented by the black line as in the previous
example.
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Figure 3: Admissible values of σ and δ in the TPM cycle example.
4.2 Preference reversal
We now study under what conditions the σ − δ OPM generates preference reversals in a








∗ (x,t + t
00)
where t0 ≥ t. Then if preferences can be u − σ represented and OPM holds, conditions
for preference reversal as expressed above are
u(x,t) >u(y,t0)+σ (y,t0)
u(x,t + t00) ≤ u(y,t0 + t00)+σ (y,t0 + t00)
u(y,t0 + t00) ≤ u(x,t + t00)+σ (x,t + t00)
(1)
Note that, given that the σ (.) function is positive, if the ﬁrst inequality holds so
does the third one. Turning to the case of exponential discounting and constant σ,l e t
u(x,t)=δ
























So the vagueness factor σ must be suﬃciently small to make the smaller amount initially
more attractive than the larger, later one; and suﬃciently large so that the same com-
p a r i s o ni sr e s o l v e di nt h eo p p o s i t ed i r e c t i o nw h e na l la l t e r n a t i v e sa r ep u s h e df o r w a r db y
17t00.W h e nσ lies in the interval I (x,y,δ,t,t 0,t 00) the present discounted value criterion is
not suﬃciently precise to rank (x,t + t00)a n d( y,t0 + t00). The individual resorts to the
Secondary Criterion, and prefers (y,t0 + t00).
Given σ and the preference at the initial date, preference reversal will eventually
occur after a suﬃciently long time. This is due to the fact that although σ is constant
in absolute terms, the vagueness relative to the utilities involved is increasing with time,
as the discounted values of the two amounts (and so their diﬀerence) tends to 0 as time
tends to inﬁnity. Note that in our setting preference reversal is possible whatever the date
for the earliest alternative, whereas the β − δ model can explain preference reversal only
if the earliest alternative occurs at time 0. Preference reversal may persist even when δ
tends to one.
With the σ−δ TPM, too, one can obtain preference reversal (as can be easily checked
by performing a set of calculations symmetric to the one above). However, in that case
the pairwise choices are inverted, and therefore contrary to the direction of preference
reversal which is commonly observed experimentally.
Finally, although in our model the primary ordering is not assumed to be a ‘time
preference’ in the technical sense of Masatlioglu and Ok [18], our justiﬁcation of preference
reversal is not due to this feature: preference reversal can occur even when within each
period primary preferences are complete, transitive and unchanging through time, and
satisfy additional continuity conditions as required in that paper.
4.3 Interpretation of δ as a SPOt ratio
We stated before that δ measures the way the individual trades oﬀ outcomes across time.
T h i sc a nb em a d ef o r m a l l ym o r ep r e c i s e . F o rb r e v i t yw ef o c u so nt h eO P M .F o ra n y
alternative (x,tx) we are not able to deﬁne to deﬁne a ‘present value’ at time t<t x in
the standard way, as an alternative at time t which is indiﬀerent to the later alternative
(x,tx). This is because in the σ − δ model no two distinct alternatives are indiﬀerent,
as Â∗ is a strict order. However, we can deﬁne a closely related concept, the Smallest




Note that s(x,tx,t) is not exactly a present value in the sense of being indiﬀerent to
(x,tx). However, s(x,tx,t)i st h ei n ﬁmum of the outcomes available at time t which
are preferred to x. To see this, assume that σ is suﬃciently small that s(x,tx,t) <x .
Then all outcomes at time t which are greater than s(x,tx,t) are preferred to (x,tx)b y
the Primary Criterion, and (x,tx) is preferred to all outcomes at time t which are not
18greater than s(x,tx,t) by either the Primary or the Secondary Criterion. So a SPOt
expresses an individual’s ’willingness to pay’ to anticipate an alternative to time t.T h e n
for 0 ≤ t − 1,t<t x we have δ
ts(x,tx,t)=δ
txx +σ = δ
t−1s(x,tx,t− 1), so that δ can be




Therefore δ can be interpreted as the (subjective) price to anticipate a given alternative
(x,tx) by one additional period from t +1t ot.
An analogous deﬁnition can be given if s(x,tx,t) >x .
These comments on interpretation are also useful for an empirical estimation of the
parameters δ and σ. What the above shows is that they can be elicited by asking subjects
questions about willingness to pay in a way similar to the standard procedures used to
elicit discount factors.
5 Discussion and concluding remarks
Recent evidence has posed a challenge to the traditional model of exponential discounting
used to formalise time preferences. With the few notable exceptions discussed earlier,
economists have mainly faced this challenge by modifying the exponential discounting
function to a hyperbolic one. We have proposed that, instead, the evidence calls for a
framework that is adherent to the cognitive procedures human decision makers adopt when
making choices involving time. We have highlighted one particular cognitive shortcoming
in evaluating future events (vagueness) and suggested one decision heuristics to resolve
situations of vagueness. Even focussing on the simplest possible model in the class of our
representations, and the one with the smallest departure from exponential discounting,
we can explain several apparent paradoxes of decision making. Our modelling approach
suggests in a sense a compromise between an ‘economic’ view based on rational orderings,
and a ‘psychological’ view, based on heuristics.
Our theory is diﬀerent from the standard one not so much because of a functional
form change, but because it does not rely on the maximisation of a transitive ordering.
In the second part of the paper we have focussed on the σ −δ specialisation of the theory
because it is the simplest departure from the standard exponential discounting model
which is still able to accommodate major anomalies. Clearly, however, any two-parameter
model is valid only in a restricted context13. For instance, the σ−δ OPM cannot account
13The same applies to the β − δ specialisation of the the hyperbolic model, which for instance can
account for preference reversal only when the initial time 0 is involved.
19for ‘size eﬀects’ of the following type: suppose that δ = .7a n dσ =1 ,s ot h a t( 9 ,0) is
preferred to (10,1) but (10,3) is preferred to (9,2), so that preference reversal occurs14.
Suppose now we double the stakes, and thus look at comparisons between (18,0) and
(20,1), and between (18,2) and (20,3). Now it is easy to verify that the σ − δ OPM
predicts a preference for the smaller, earlier amount in both comparisons, and preference
reversal no longer occurs15. To some this might appear contrary to introspection: if for
small stakes one is willing to wait for a future monetary gain (so that (10,3) is preferred
to (9,2)), then he should be even more willing if this gain is doubled. First of all one could
argue that in the above example the misprediction is due to a misspeciﬁcation of the taste
parameters δ and σ: preference reversal exhibited in both comparisons would for instance
be compatible16 with σ ∈ [1.96,2). More importantly, the apparent misprediction of the
example is based on the implicit assumption that diﬀerences matter, and that some sort
of internal consistency based on similarity is relied upon, so that if a unitary gain calls
for preference reversal, so must a gain which is double in size17. Still, there is nothing
particularly unreasonable in ﬁnding it more diﬃcult to make comparisons when high
stakes are involved. So for instance the vagueness term σ (y,t)c a nb em o d e l l e da sa
proportion of the outcome, that is σ(y,t)=σy for some percentage σ.T h e n w e h a v e
that x>δ
ty +σy if and only if λx>δ
t (λy)+σ (λy) for any positive scaling factor λ,s o
that the ‘misprediction’ of the numerical example above disappears18.
Note that this specialisation belongs to our general class of representations. The crucial
aspect is that the vagueness term enters additively. Therefore any form of discounting
in the utility function u is compatible with increasing relative vagueness whenever the
vagueness term σ(y,t) is time-independent (or even when, if utility is discounted expo-
nentially, σ (y,t) increases less than exponentially with time). It is not necessary that
σ (y,t) is a constant, which is instead our assumption in the σ − δ model.
To sum up, our theory is more general than the σ −δ specialisation. The exponential
discounting part of it is not central - indeed, it may well be that hyperbolic discounting
14Note that u(9,0) = 9 > (.7)10+1 = 8 = u(10,1)+σ,w h i l eu(9,2) = 9(.7)
2 =4 .41 < 10(.7)
3 +1=
4.43 = u(10,3) + σ.
15Now u(18,0) = 18 > (.7)20 + 1 = 15 = u(20,1) + σ,a n da l s ou(18,2) = 18(.7)
2 =8 .82 >
20(.7)
3 +1=7.86 = u(20,3) + σ.
16Now the required inequalities are 9 − (.7)10 = 2 > σ and 9(.7)
2 − 10(.7)
3 = .98 ≤ σ for the ‘small
stakes’ comparison; and 18 − (.7)20 = 4 > σ and 18(.7)
2 − 20(.7)
3 =1 .96 ≤ σ for the ‘high stakes’
comparison.
17Incidentally, this also seem to rely on a ‘similarity’ heuristic based on diﬀerences in one component
- our initial premise was the rejection of this assumption as a starting point.
18Preference reversal (between times 0 and k) is obtained when y>xand x>δ
ty + σy holds simul-
taneously with δ
kx ≤ δ





20is the ‘psychologically correct’ way of dealing with preference for anticipation. In this
light, our core ideas may be viewed as complementary, rather than in contrast, to the
c l a s so fh y p e r b o l i cd i s c o u n t i n gm o d e l s .W eb e l i e v et h e yb r i n gt ot h ef o r es o m ei n t e r e s t i n g
cognitive aspects of choice over time that the existing theories do not consider.
Our model is limited in that so far it does not deal with utility streams. Although the
existing models of discounting have been readily applied to streams, we believe that this
topic requires some special considerations. An important contribution in the same spirit as
ours is that by Jehiel and Lilico [12]. They model the decision maker’s bounded rationality
as limited foresight, so in this sense their agents are also ‘vague’ about the future. We
leave the extension of our own framework to utility streams to future research.
6 Appendix
Proposition 3 Let X = T =[ 0 ,1]. Let Discrimination, Time Monotonicity (i), Outcome
Monotonicity (i), Continuity and Betweenness hold. Then Â is (u,σ)-representable with
σ (a) ≥ 0 for all a ∈ A and u non-decreasing in outcome and non-increasing in time.
Proof.D e ﬁne u(a)=λ(L(a)), where λ denotes the Lebesgue measure. By Time
Monotonicity (i) and Outcome Monotonicity (i), the function u is weakly monotonic in
the desired direction with respect to time and outcomes. Let
L
∗ (a)= l i m
b∈V (a)
L(b)
This limit is well deﬁned since by Discrimination the sets L(b) in the formula are nested.
Denote λ
∗ (a)=λ(L∗ (a)), and deﬁne
σ (a)=m a x{0,λ
∗ (a) − u(a)}
We show that u and σ as deﬁned above represent Â. Suppose a Â b.W eh a v eL(b) ⊂ L(a)
by the transitivity and irreﬂexivity of Â, and by Betweenness λ(L(a)) > λ(L(b)), that
is u(a) >u(b). Now suppose in negation that
u(a) ≤ u(b)+σ (b)
By construction σ (b)=m a x{0,λ
∗(b) − u(b)}.I fσ (b) = 0 we get an immediate contra-
diction with u(a) >u(b). So let instead σ (b)=λ
∗(b) − u(b)a n dt h e r e f o r e
u(a) ≤ u(b)+σ(b)=λ
∗(b)
21Suppose there exists b∗ ∈ V (b)s u c ht h a tλ(L(b∗)) = λ
∗ (b). Then we have u(a) ≤ u(b∗).
By Discrimination L(a) ⊆ L(b∗), so that b ∈ L(a) contradicts b ∈ V (b∗). We show
ﬁnally that such a b∗ exists. If not, then L∗ (b) / ∈ {L(b0)|b0 ∈ V (b)} and there must exist
a sequence {bn},w i t hbn ∈ V (b) for all n,a n dw i t hl i mbn = b∗ / ∈ V (b). If b∗ Â b then (i)
of Continuity is violated, and if b Â b∗ then (ii) of Continuity is violated.
The proof concludes as the proof of proposition 1.
Proposition 4 Let X and T be countable sets. Let Discrimination, Time Monotonicity
(i), Outcome Monotonicity (i) hold. Suppose that (lim{an}) ∈ V (a) for any sequence
{an} with an ∈ V (a).T h e nÂ is (u,σ)-representable with σ (a) ≥ 0 for all a ∈ A and u
non-decreasing in outcome and non-increasing in time.
Proof. The proof is the same as the proof of proposition 3, where λ(a)d e ﬁnes a
numerical representation of the partial order of strict set inclusion instead of the Lebesgue
measure (see e.g. Fishburn [6] for the existence of such a numerical representation). Note
that the limit property in the statement implies the existence of a b∗ ∈ V (b) such that
λ(L(b∗)) = λ
∗ (b).
Proposition 5 Let Â be (u,σ)-representable with σ(a) ≥ 0 for all a ∈ A and let
Time Monotonicity (i) and (ii), and Outcome Monotonicity (i) and (ii) hold. If σ can
be chosen to be non-increasing in outcome, then u can be chosen to be non-decreasing
in outcome at an arbitrarily large number of alternatives, and if σ can be chosen to be
non-decreasing in time then u can be chosen to be non-increasing in time at an arbitrarily
large number of alternatives.
Proof. Fix a representation u and σ, and suppose that u is decreasing in outcome at
some point, that is there exist x2Px1 and t such that u(x1,t) >u(x2,t). Consider the






u(x2,t)i fx = x1 and t0 = t
u(x,t0)o t h e r w i s e
This represents the same preferences as u.T o s e e t h i s , n o t e ﬁrst that, for any (y,t0) Â
(x1,t), since u and σ represent Â we have u(y,t0) >u(x1,t)+σ (x1,t), and therefore
v (y,t
0)=u(y,t
0) >u(x1,t)+σ(x1,t) >u(x2,t)+σ (x1,t)=v (x1,t)+σ(x1,t)
so that v and σ still represent Â for all alternatives which are preferred to (x1,t).
Next consider (x1,t) Â (y,t0). Suppose by contradiction that v (x1,t) ≤ u(y,t0)+
σ (y,t0). Then by construction u(x2,t) ≤ u(y,t0)+σ (y,t0), so that (x2,t) ¨ (y,t0). This
together with (x1,t) Â (y,t0) contradicts part (i) of Outcome Monotonicity.
22Consider now (x1,t) ∼ (y,t0). Suppose by contradiction that u(y,t0) >v (x1,t)+
σ (x1,t). Then by construction u(y,t0) >u(x2,t)+σ (x1,t) ≥ u(x2,t)+σ(x2,t), where
the second inequality follows form the monotonicity assumption on σ in the statement.
Then (y,t0) Â (x2,t), which together with (x1,t) ∼ (y,t0) contradicts part (ii) of Outcome
Monotonicity.
This procedure can be repeated for an arbitrarily large number of pairs of alternatives
where non-monotonicity occurs.
Finally, to prove that if σ c a nb ec h o s e nt ob en o n - d e c r e a s i n gi nt i m et h e nu can
be chosen to be non-increasing in time arguments essentially identical to the ones above







u(x,t1)i fx0 = x and t = t2
u(x0,t)o t h e r w i s e
at all points such that u(x,t2) >u(x,t1)w i t ht2 >t 1.
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